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Abstract
We present the first cryptographically sound Dolev-Yao-style security proof of a comprehensive
electronic payment system. The payment system is a slightly simplified variant of the 3KP payment
system and comprises a variety of different security requirements ranging from basic ones like the im-
possibility of unauthorized payments to more sophisticated properties like disputability. We show that
the payment system is secure against arbitrary active attacks, including arbitrary concurrent protocol
runs and arbitrary manipulation of bitstrings within polynomial time if the protocol is implemented
using provably secure cryptographic primitives. Although we achieve security under cryptographic
definitions, our proof does not have to deal with probabilistic aspects of cryptography and is hence
within the scope of current proof tools. The reason is that we exploit a recently proposed Dolev-
Yao-style cryptographic library with a provably secure cryptographic implementation. Together with
composition and preservation theorems of the underlying model, this allows us to perform the actual
proof effort in a deterministic setting corresponding to a slightly extended Dolev-Yao model.
1 Introduction
It is hardly necessary today to justify or stress the importance of electronic commerce, which has been
rapidly gaining momentum since the early nineties, and is equally appealing to online merchants, con-
sumers, and payment providers. The core of electronic commerce is an electronic payment system that
is supposed to fulfill the individual requirements of the participating parties. These range from standard
requirements like the impossibility of unauthorized payments, to more sophisticated ones like granting
individuals the ability to succeed in disputes in cases where they have been betrayed. Devising a payment
system that lives up to these requirements has been a challenging task, and many payment systems that
were claimed to be provably secure have fallen prey to subsequent attacks in the past [74, 73]. Today, it
is commonly agreed that cryptographic protocols in general and payment systems in particular have to
contain a rigorous proof of security in order to be acceptable.
One way to conduct such a proof is the cryptographic approach. Its security definitions are based on
complexity theory, e.g., [53, 51, 35]. The security of a cryptographic protocol is proved by reduction,
∗An earlier version of this work appeared at [7].
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i.e., by showing that breaking the protocol implies breaking one of the underlying cryptographic primi-
tives with respect to its cryptographic definition and thus finally a computational assumption such as the
hardness of integer factoring. This approach captures a very comprehensive adversary model and allows
mathematically rigorous proofs. However, because of probabilism and computational restrictions, these
proofs have had to be done by hand so far, which often yields proofs with faults or gaps. Moreover, such
proofs rapidly become too complex for larger protocols, which was one of the main reasons why even
comparatively small payment systems have proved considerably error-prone in the past.
The alternative is the formal-methods approach, which is concerned with the automation of proofs
using model checkers and theorem provers. As these tools currently cannot deal with cryptographic
details such as error probabilities and computational restrictions, abstractions of cryptography are used.1
They are almost always based on the so-called Dolev-Yao model [49], which represents cryptography as
term algebras. The use of term algebras simplifies proofs of larger protocols considerably and has led to
a large body of literature on analyzing protocol security using various techniques for formal verification,
e.g., [68, 64, 59, 38, 72, 1].
Employing the Dolev-Yao abstraction—or abstractions of a similar flavor—to the analysis of a pay-
ment system using tool support or paper-based reasoning has proved to be an extremely valuable ap-
proach; a far from exhaustive list of work along those lines includes [58, 37, 36, 60, 65, 31, 32]. Although
these approaches are suitable for reasoning about the security of large-scale systems, their drawback is
that they exist only in the Dolev-Yao model and there is no theorem that carries these results over to the
cryptographic approach with its much more comprehensive adversary.
We close this gap by providing the first security proof of a payment system that is both within the
scope of formal proof tools and is sound with respect to the rigorous definitions and the comprehensive
adversary model of cryptography. The payment system is a slightly simplified variant of the 3KP payment
system [34, 33] and comprises a variety of different security requirements ranging from basic ones like
the impossibility of unauthorized payments and weak atomicity to more sophisticated properties like
disputability. More precisely, we show that the payment system is secure against arbitrary active attacks,
including arbitrary concurrent protocol runs and arbitrary manipulation of bitstrings within polynomial
time. The underlying model ensures strong composability so that our payment system can be used as
a submodule within larger protocols without degrading its proved security properties. The underlying
assumption is that the Dolev-Yao-style abstraction of digital signatures is implemented using a chosen-
message secure digital signature scheme with small additions like signature tagging. Chosen-message
security was introduced in [54], and efficient signature systems that are secure in this sense exist under
reasonable assumptions [54, 48, 50].
Our proof relies on a recent general result that a so-called ideal cryptographic library, which im-
plements a slightly extended Dolev-Yao model, can be securely realized by a specific cryptographic
implementation [22, 24, 16, 28]. A composition theorem for the underlying security notion implies that
protocol proofs can be made using the ideal library, and security then carries over automatically to the
cryptographic realization. However, because of the extension to the Dolev-Yao model, no prior formal-
methods proof carries over directly. Besides its value for the analysis of electronic payment systems, the
proof shows that, in spite of the extensions and differences in presentation with respect to prior Dolev-Yao
models, a proof can be made over the new library that seems easily accessible to current automated proof
tools. In particular, the proof contains neither probabilism nor computational restrictions.
Related Work. The design of electronic payment systems has a long history, dating back to the eighties
and early nineties [43, 44, 47, 45, 46, 71]. Based on these works, a substantial body of commercial
1Efforts exist to formulate syntactic calculi for dealing with probabilism and polynomial-time considerations, in particular
[69, 70, 57]. However, this approach cannot yet handle protocols with any degree of automation.
attempts at electronic payment systems emerged. The iKP family [34, 33] constituted one of the most
important of those attempts. It is the direct predecessor of today’s prevailing SET standard, and offered a
variety of strong security guarantees while still relying on relatively simple underlying mechanisms. We
refer to [4] for an exhaustive overview of the other attempts.
Work on justifying Dolev-Yao-style models under cryptographic definitions prior to [22] was re-
stricted to passive adversaries and symmetric encryption [3, 2, 61]. Concurrently with [22], an extension
to asymmetric encryption—but still under passive attacks only—was presented in [56]. The underlying
Master’s thesis [55] considers asymmetric encryption under active attacks, but does so in the random
oracle model, which is itself an idealization of cryptography and is not justifiable [41]. The recent work
of [67] gives a slightly more efficient implementation of asymmetric encryption than [22] (no additional
tagging and randomization) at the cost of a much less general library and a weaker security notion. The
outlook in [67] would essentially yield [22] again. Since computational soundness has become a highly
active line of research, we exemplarily list further recent results in this area without going into further
details [11, 23, 26, 20, 9, 17, 8, 29, 12].
Based on the ideal Dolev-Yao-style library, the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe, Otway-Rees
and Yahalom protocols have been analyzed in a cryptographically sound way [15, 5, 19]. In contrast to
the proof in this paper, these proofs did not have to reason about digital signatures and related aspects
like non-repudiation, and the protocols are rather small examples compared to a comprehensive pay-
ment system. We stress though that our result serves as further exemplification of the usefulness of the
cryptographic library [22], their extensions [16, 28], and the corresponding general theorems for linking
symbolic and cryptographic properties based on this library [10, 21, 13, 14, 18, 6] for the cryptograph-
ically sound verification of cryptographic protocols. Recently, [42] showed how to translate a specific
class of protocols expressed in the UC framework [40] into corresponding representations in the strand
space approach and plans to exploit existing tools for this specific Dolev-Yao model, e.g., Athena [77]. At
the moment, the work is restricted to mutual authentication and key exchange protocols, and in contrast
to [22] hence does not address soundness of Dolev-Yao models in their usual generality.
The security notion used for the relation between the ideal Dolev-Yao-style library and its crypto-
graphic implementation, reactive simulatability, and its composition properties were introduced in [75]
and extended to asynchronous systems in [76, 40, 27, 25]. It extends the security notions of multiparty
(one-step) function evaluation [78, 51, 52, 66, 30, 39] and the observational equivalence of [62]. There
are multiple possible layers of sound abstraction from cryptography in the sense of reactive simulatability
besides Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic libraries. They reach from low-level idealizations that still have
real cryptographic in- and outputs to high-level abstractions like secure channels. The specific aspects of
a Dolev-Yao-style abstraction are simple operator-tree abstractions from nested cryptographic terms, the
restriction of adversary capabilities to algebraic operations on such terms, and the assumption that terms
whose equality cannot be derived explicitly are always unequal.
2 Description of the Payment Protocol
Let u be a client, v a merchant, and ac the acquirer. We assume that u, v, and ac initially agreed on
a description d of the good and its price p. A successful termination of the protocol will then ensure
that the parties used the same description and the same price as their local inputs to the protocol, i.e., a
party can neither cheat by tampering with these inputs nor can it re-exploit an already finished payment
transaction. To simplify notation we let signatures include the signed message. We further assume that
every participating party w initially holds a secret signature key sksw and that the corresponding public
key has already been distributed authentically to the other parties.
Figure 1 summarizes the main, so-called optimistic part of the protocol in the usual protocol notation.
The part between the dotted lines contains the description of the actual protocol, consisting of five steps
executed among client u, merchant v, and acquirer ac. The parts above and below the dotted lines
represent the local inputs and outputs of the protocol, respectively. They correspond to interface events
that enable interaction with the users of the payment system or with higher-level programs. The protocol
belongs to the class of pay-now protocols which have in common that inputs pay, receive, and allow from
the client, the merchant, and the acquirer, respectively, and the outputs paid, received, and transfer to the
client, the merchant, and the acquirer, respectively, occur in one single transaction. Besides its optimistic
part, the protocol further offers a separate dispute part, which allows each party to contact a trusted third
party to resolve disputes. We will elaborate on both parts of the protocol in the following.
Optimistic Part. The merchant v starts the protocol upon receiving a local input (receive, d, p, u),
which indicates agreement to receive the money p in exchange for the good d from u. The merchant
computes a signature sigv := signsksv (invoice, d, p, u, v) and sends (invoice, sigv) to client u.
Upon receiving a message (invoice, sigv), the client u tests if sigv is a valid signature with respect to
v’s public key of correctly formed data. If u has not received a local command (pay, d, p, v), which autho-
rizes this payment, he stores the received data d, p, v and waits for this local command. If it has already
occurred or when it occurs, u computes sigu := signsksu (payment, d, p, u, v) and sends (payment, sigu)
to v.
Upon receiving a message (payment, sigu), the merchant v tests if sigu is a valid signature with
respect to u’s public key of the correct data. If v has sent an invoice with the same parameters d, p, u, v to
client u before, he saves sigu for later use in disputes and sends (auth request, sigu, sigv) to the acquirer
ac.
Upon receiving (auth request, sigu, sigv), the acquirer ac tests if both signatures are valid signatures
with respect to the respective public keys and if the data d, p, u, v contained in both signatures are iden-
tical. If ac has not yet received a local command (allow, d, p, u, v) indicating consent to the payment, he
stores the received data until this local command occurs. If it has already occurred or when it occurs,
ac computes sigac := signsksac(auth response, d, p, u, v), sends (auth response, sigac) to v, stores this
payment as being processed to prevent multiple deductions of money for the same payment transaction,
and outputs (transfer, d, p, u, v) locally.
Upon receiving (auth response, sigac), the merchant v checks the validity of the signature with re-
spect to ac’s public key and if v has earlier sent an authentication request to the acquirer containing d, p, u,
and v. He then sends (confirm, sigac) to client u and outputs (received, d, p, u) locally.
Upon receiving (confirm, sigac), the client checks the validity of the signature with respect to ac’s
public key and if u has earlier sent a payment with matching data. He then outputs (paid, d, p, v) locally.
Disputes. Disputes enable a party to prove that specific outputs have occurred. Note that the trusted
third party is not involved in the optimistic part of the protocol as described above, but it will only be
invoked if two parties disagree whether the payment took place or not.
The structure of the dispute protocol is very simple, hence we omit a picture along the lines of Fig-
ure 1. A party w (either a client u, a merchant v, or the acquirer ac) can start a dispute by inputting a local
command (dispute, d, p, v) (or (dispute, d, p, u, v) if w = ac). As a prerequisite to initiate a dispute, w
must have received the signatures of the corresponding parties in the optimistic part of the protocol exe-
cution. In this case, w computes sig∗ := signsksw (dispute, sigx, sigx′) where {x, x
′} = {u, v, ac} \ {w}
and sends sig∗ to the trusted third party. Upon receiving a message sig∗ from w, the trusted third party
checks if the signature is valid for w’s public key, if it is of the correct form, and if both contained signa-
tures are valid signatures for the respective public keys and of the correct and matching data. In this case
it outputs (dispute, true, d, p, u, v), and (dispute, false, d, p, u, v) otherwise.
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Figure 1: Optimistic Part of the Protocol
3 The Payment Protocol Using the Dolev-Yao-style Cryptographic Li-
brary
Almost all formal proof techniques for protocols first need a reformulation of the protocol into a more
detailed version than the five steps above. These details include necessary tests on received messages,
the types and generation rules for values like u and sigu, and a surrounding framework specifying the
number of participants, the possibilities of multiple protocol runs, and the adversary capabilities. The
same is true when using the Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library from [22], i.e., it plays a similar role
in our proof as “the CSP Dolev-Yao model” or “the inductive-approach Dolev-Yao model” in other proofs.
Our protocol formulation in this framework is given in Section 3.1.2 We there explain this formulation in
detail exemplarily for the clients, and then explain general aspects of the surrounding framework as far
as needed in our proofs.
3.1 Detailed Protocol Descriptions
We write “:=” for deterministic assignment, and ↓ is an error element available as an addition to the
domains and ranges of all functions and algorithms. The framework is automata-based, i.e., protocols are
executed by interacting machines, and event-based, i.e., machines react on received inputs. We assume a
setM := {1, . . . , n} of users that is partitioned into a setMclient of clients, a setMmerchant of merchants,
an acquirer ac, and a trusted third party ttp. By MPSu we denote the payment protocol machine for a user
u. Let Σ denote a finite alphabet and let Σ∗ denote the set of strings over it.
2For some frameworks there are compilers to generate these detailed protocol descriptions, e.g., [63]. This should be possible
for this framework in a similar way.
3.1.1 Clients
Let u ∈ Mclient denote a client. The main data structure of MPSu is a database DPSu for storing the
initial information related to the payments, their current status, as well as additional information gained
during the protocol execution. Generally, a database D is a set of functions, called entries, each over a
finite domain called attributes. For an entry x ∈ D, the value at an attribute att is written x.att . For a
predicate pred involving attributes, D[pred ] means the subset of entries whose attributes fulfill pred . If
D[pred ] contains only one element, we use the same notation for this element. Adding an entry x to D
is abbreviated D :⇐ x. Further, we write the list operation as l := (x1, . . . , xj), and the arguments are
unambiguously retrievable as l[i], with l[i] = ↓ if i > j. In our case, each entry x in DPSu can have the
arguments
(ind , desc, price ,merch , sigm, sigac, status).
where the arguments have the following types and meaning:
• x.ind ∈ INDS, called index, consecutively numbers all entries in DPSu . The set INDS is
isomorphic to N and is used to distinguish index arguments from others. The index is used as a
primary key attribute of the database, i.e., we write DPSu [i] for the selection DPSu [ind = i]. We
further use the convention that look-ups in DPSu always return the element with the smallest index
whose attributes fulfill the queried predicate.
• x.desc ∈ Σ∗ is the description of the good to be purchased.
• x.price ∈ N denotes the price of the good.
• x.merch ∈ Mmerchant is the identifier of the merchant that should receive the payment.
• x.sigm, x.sigac ∈ HNDS denote handles to the merchant’s and the acquirer’s signature, respec-
tively. They will be stored during the execution of the protocol and read only for disputes. The set
HNDS is yet another set isomorphic to N. We always use a superscript “hnd” for handles.
• x.status ∈ {invoice, pay, processed} denotes the status of the transaction. Here invoice means that
the client has received the invoice of the merchant, pay that the client gave consent to the payment,
and processed that both events happened and that the payment has hence been performed.
Initially, DPSu is empty. MPSu furthermore a variable cur indu ∈ INDS initialized with 0 counting the
size of DPSu , and used as index for new entries in DPSu .
The first type of input that MPSu can receive is a message (pay, d, p, v) from its user denoting that
consent for a payment with description d, price p, and merchant v is given. User inputs are distinguished
from network inputs by arriving at a so-called port PS inu?. The “?” for input ports follows the CSP-
convention, and “PS” stands for payment system because the user interface is the same for all payment
system of the considered kind. The reaction on this input is described in Algorithm 1. MPSu first checks
if a corresponding invoice with the same parameters has already been received before. In this case, the
machine MPSu declares this entry to be processed and builds up a term corresponding to the payment
message of the protocol using the ideal cryptographic library. The command store inserts arbitrary ap-
plication data into the cryptographic library. The command list forms a list and sign creates an abstract
digital signature entry. The final command send i means that MPSu attempts to send the resulting term
to v over an insecure channel. If no prior invoice message with suitable parameters occurred, MPSu only
creates a new database entry that will be processed when the invoice message is received. The superscript
hnd on most parameters denotes that these are handles, i.e., local names that this machine has for the
corresponding terms. This is an important aspect of [22] because it allows the same protocol description
Algorithm 1 Client: Evaluation of Users Inputs for Payment Consent in MPSu
Input: (pay, d, p, v) at PS inu? with d ∈ Σ∗, p ∈ N, and v ∈ Mmerchant,
1: i := DPSu [desc = d ∧ price = p ∧merch = v].ind .
2: if i 6= ↓ ∧ DPSu [i].status = invoice then
3: DPSu [i].status := processed.
4: paymenthnd ← store(payment).
5: dhnd ← store(d).
6: phnd ← store(p).
7: uhnd ← store(u).
8: vhnd ← store(v).
9: lhnd ← list(paymenthnd, dhnd, phnd, uhnd, vhnd).
10: shnd ← sign(skshndu , l
hnd).
11: mhnd ← list(paymenthnd, shnd).
12: send i(v,mhnd).
13: else if i = ↓ then
14: DPSu :⇐ (cur indu++, d, p, v, ↓, ↓, pay).
15: end if
to be implemented once with Dolev-Yao-style idealized cryptography and once with real cryptography.
More precisely, the four commands we saw so far and their input and output domains belong to the inter-
face (in the same sense as, e.g., a Java interface) of the underlying cryptographic library. This interface
is implemented by both the idealized and the real version. In the first case, the handles are local names
of Dolev-Yao-style terms, in the second case of real cryptographic bitstrings. We say more about these
two implementations below. The effect of send i in the ideal implementation is that the adversary obtains
a handle to the Dolev-Yao-style term and can decide what to do with it (such as forwarding it to MPSv
or performing Dolev-Yao-style algebraic operations on the term); the effect in the real implementation is
that the adversary obtains the real bitstring and can perform arbitrary bit manipulations on it.
The behavior of MPSu upon receiving an input from the cryptographic library (corresponding to a
message that arrives over the network) is defined similarly in Algorithm 2. The input arrives at port
outu? and is of the form (v, u, i, lhnd) where v is the supposed sender, i denotes that the channel is
insecure, and lhnd is a handle to a list. The port outu? is connected to the cryptographic library, whose
two implementations represent the obtained Dolev-Yao-style term or real bitstring, respectively, to the
protocol in a unified way by a handle. In this algorithm, MPSu first determines if the message corresponds
to an invoice message or a confirmation message, i.e., if the message could correspond to the first or the
fifth message in the protocol description. In the first case, MPSu first determines if the contained signature
is a valid signature of the merchant for the correct data, and aborts at failure. If the user already gave
consent to the payment, i.e., if a suitable entry with status pay already exists in the database, MPSu stores
the merchant’s signature, updates the status of this payment to processed, constructs a message according
to the protocol description, and sends it to the intended recipient. If payment consent has not been given
yet, MPSu only creates a new database entry that contains the payment information of the invoice message.
The evaluation of a confirmation message works similarly: MPSu checks the validity of the acquirer’s
signature and if a suitable entry already exists in the database, and in that case signals to its user at port
PS outu ! the successful completion of the payment.
Finally, MPSu can receive a dispute message (dispute, d, p, v) from its user at PS inu?. The behaviour
of MPSu on this input is defined in Algorithm 3. It first checks if an entry with corresponding parameters
already exists in the database. If furthermore the corresponding signatures of the respective merchant and
the acquirer have already been received for this entry, MPSu builds up a term according to the protocol
Algorithm 2 Client: Evaluation of Inputs from the Cryptographic Library in MPSu
Input: (v, u, i, lhnd) at outu? with v ∈Mmerchant.
1: lhndj ← list proj(l
hnd, j) for j = 1, 2.
2: l1 ← retrieve(lhnd1 ).
3: if l1 = invoice then
4: mhnd
2
← msg of sig(lhnd
2
).
5: b← verify(lhnd
2
, pkshndu,v ,m
hnd
2
)
6: xhndj ← list proj(m
hnd
2
, j) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
7: xj ← retrieve(xhndj ) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
8: i := DPSu [desc = x2 ∧ price = x3 ∧merch = x5].ind.
9: if x1 = invoice ∧ x4 = u ∧ x5 = v ∧ b = true ∧ i 6= ↓ ∧ DPSu [i].status = pay then
10: DPSu [i].sigm := l
hnd
2
.
11: DPSu [i].status := processed.
12: paymenthnd ← store(payment).
13: mhnd
1
← list(paymenthnd, xhnd
2
, xhnd
3
, xhnd
4
, xhnd
5
).
14: shnd
1
← sign(skshndu ,m
hnd
1
).
15: mhnd ← list(paymenthnd, shnd
1
).
16: send i(v,mhnd).
17: else if x1 = invoice ∧ x4 = u ∧ x5 = v ∧ b = true ∧ i = ↓ then
18: DPSu :⇐ (cur indu++, x2, x3, x5, l
hnd
2
, ↓, invoice).
19: end if
20: else if l1 = confirm then
21: mhnd
2
← msg of sig(lhnd
2
).
22: b← verify(lhnd
2
, pkshndu,ac,m
hnd
2
)
23: xhndj ← list proj(m
hnd
2
, j) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
24: xj ← retrieve(xhndj ) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
25: i := DPSu [desc = x2 ∧ price = x3 ∧merch = x5 ∧ sigac = ↓ ∧ status = processed].ind.
26: if x1 = auth response ∧ x4 = u ∧ x5 = v ∧ b = true ∧ i 6= ↓ then
27: DPSu [i].sigac := l
hnd
2
.
28: Output (paid, x2, x3, x5) at PS outu !.
29: end if
30: end if
Algorithm 3 Client: Evaluation of User Inputs for Disputes in MPSu
Input: (dispute, d, p, v) at PS inu? with d ∈ Σ∗, p ∈ N, and v ∈ Mmerchant.
1: if i := DPSu [desc = d ∧ price = p ∧merch = v ∧ sigm 6= ↓ ∧ sigac 6= ↓].ind 6= ↓ then
2: disputehnd ← store(dispute).
3: lhnd ← list(disputehnd,DPSu [i].sigm,D
PS
u [i].sigac).
4: shnd ← sign(skshndu , l
hnd).
5: mhnd ← list(shnd).
6: send i(ttp,mhnd).
7: end if
description and sends it to the trusted third party.
Every algorithm should immediately abort the handling of the current input if a cryptographic com-
mand does not yield the desired result, e.g., if a database look-up fails. For readability we omitted this
in the algorithmic descriptions; instead we impose the following convention on these and the following
algorithms.
Convention 1 If MPSu for u ∈ M receives ↓ as the answer of the cryptographic library to a command,
then MPSu aborts the execution of the current algorithm, except for the command types list proj or send i.
3.1.2 Merchants
Let u ∈ Mmerchant denote a merchant. Similar to the protocol machines of the clients, the machine MPSu
maintains an initially empty database DPSu as its main data structure, together with a variable cur indu ∈
INDS for counting the size of the database and creating new indices. The entries of DPSu have the form
(ind , desc, price , client , sigc, sigac).
For x ∈ DPSu :
• x.ind , x.desc, x.price , and x.sigac are defined as in the database of the client machines.
• x.client ∈ Mclient denotes the client of this transaction.
• x.sigc ∈ HNDS denotes the handle of the client’s signature, which will be collected during the
protocol execution.
The machine MPSu accepts inputs for sending an invoice to a client and for initiating a dispute from its
user at port PS inu?, and inputs from the cryptographic library at port inu?. After explaining the behavior
of the protocol machines of the clients, the behavior of MPSu should be essentially clear from the protocol
description of Section 2. We postpone the algorithmic description to the Appendix.
3.1.3 Acquirer
The machine MPSac of the acquirer maintains a variable cur indac ∈ INDS initialized with 0 and an
initially empty database DPSac , where each entry x ∈ DPSac can have arguments
(ind , desc, price , client ,merch , sigc, sigm, status)
with the following types and meanings:
• x.ind , x.desc, x.price , x.client , x.merch , x.sigc, and x.sigm are defined as in the databases of the
client and merchant machines.
• x.status ∈ {allow, auth request, processed} denotes the status of the transaction, cf. the state
of the client machines. Here allow means that the acquirer has given consent to the payment,
auth request that the merchant requested authentication of the payment, and processed that both
events happened.
The machine MPSac accepts inputs for processing a payment from user ac at port PS inac?, and inputs from
the cryptographic library at port inac?. The algorithmic description of MPSac is postponed to the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Overview of the Payment System (here for the case H = {u, ttp}).
3.1.4 Trusted Third Party
The machine MPSttp of the trusted third party only accepts input from the cryptographic library at port
inttp?. Upon receiving such an input, it first checks the validity of the signature and if the message is
indeed a well-formed dispute message. It then identifies the parties that are involved in the payment and
determines whether the dispute should be allowed or denied by checking the validity of the contained
signatures and if they have been issued on matching parameters. The algorithmic description can be
found in the Appendix.
3.2 Further Initial State
We have assumed in the algorithms that each protocol machine MPSu already has a handle skshndu to its
own secret signature key and handles pkshndu,v to the public keys of every participant v. The cryptographic
library can also represent key generation and distribution by normal commands. Further, we assume that
each machine MPSu contains the bitstring u denoting its identity.
3.3 Overall Framework and Adversarial Model
The framework that determines how machines such as our payment system machines and the machines
of the idealized or real cryptographic library execute is taken from [76, 27]. The basis is an asynchronous
probabilistic execution model with distributed scheduling. We already used implicitly above that for term
construction and parsing commands to the cryptographic library, a so-called local scheduling is defined,
i.e., a result is returned immediately. The idealized or real network sending via this library, however, is
scheduled by the adversary.
When protocol machines such as MPSu for certain users u ∈ {1, . . . , n} are defined, there is no
guarantee that all these machines are correct. A trust model determines for what subsets H of {1, . . . , n}
we want to guarantee anything; in our case this is for all subsets which comprise at least the trusted
third party. Incorrect machines disappear and are replaced by the adversary. Each set of potential correct
machines together with its user interface is called a structure, and the set of these structures is called the
system. When considering the security of a structure, an arbitrary probabilistic machine H is connected
to the user interface to represent all users, and an arbitrary machine A is connected to the remaining
free ports (typically the network) and to H to represent the adversary, see Figure 2. In polynomial-time
security proofs, H and A are polynomial-time.
This setting, more precisely the underlying model of secure reactive systems [76, 27], implies that
any number of concurrent protocol runs with both honest participants and the adversary are considered
because H and A can arbitrarily interleave local inputs of the payment protocol with the delivery of
network messages.
For a set H of honest participants, the user interface of the ideal and real cryptographic library is
the port set S cryH := {inu?, outu ! | u ∈ H}. This is where the payment protocol machines input their
cryptographic commands and obtain results and received messages. In the ideal case this interface is
served by just one machine THcryH called trusted host which essentially administrates Dolev-Yao-style
terms under the handles. In the real case, the same interface is served by a set Mˆ cryH := {M
cry
u,H | u ∈ H} of
real cryptographic machines. The corresponding systems are called Syscry,id := {({THcryH },S
cry
H ) | H ⊆
{1, . . . , n}} and Syscry,real := {(Mˆ cryH ,S
cry
H ) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}}.
The user interface of the payment protocol machines is given by SPSH := {PS inu?,PS outu ! | u ∈
H \ {ttp}} ∪ {PS outttp!}, cf. Figure 2. The ideal and real payment systems serving this interface
differ only in the cryptographic library. With Mˆ PSH := {MPSu | u ∈ H}, they are SysPS,id := {(Mˆ PSH ∪
{THcryH },S
PS
H ) | {ttp} ⊆ H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}} and SysPS,real := {(Mˆ PSH ∪ Mˆ
cry
H ,S
PS
H ) | {ttp} ⊆ H ⊆
{1, . . . , n}}.
3.4 On Polynomial Runtime
In order to be valid users of the real cryptographic library, the machines MPSu have to be polynomial-time.
We therefore define that each machine MPSu maintains explicit polynomial bounds on the accepted mes-
sage lengths and the number of inputs accepted at each port. As this is done exactly as in the cryptographic
library, we omit the rigorous write-up.
4 The Security Properties
The arguably most important security property of a payment system is that no money can be transfered
without the client’s consent. This can be captured as an integrity property in the underlying model which
are formally sets of traces at the user interfaces of a system, i.e., here at the port sets SPSH . Intuitively,
an integrity property Req contains the “good” traces at these ports. A trace is a sequence of sets of
events. We write an event p?m or p!m, meaning that message m occurs at in- or output port p. The t-th
step of a trace r is written rt; we speak of the step at time t. To capture the aforementioned security
property we would require that each output (transfer, d, p, u, v) at a port PS outac? for an honest client
u, an honest acquirer ac, and an arbitrary (potentially malicious) merchant v is preceded by an input
(pay, d, p, v) at PS inu?. This statement can be significantly strengthened for our payment system by
requiring that whenever an arbitrary honest party successfully terminates the protocol execution, the
inputs of all honest parties have previously been received. This strengthened variant is called weak
atomicity. To simplify notation, let SuccessHonestTerm(d, p, u, v, ac, r, t) denote the predicate indicating
whether an honest party u, v, or ac has successfully terminated the payment protocol for d and p in trace
r at time t, i.e., the predicate is defined as the disjunction of (u ∈ H ∧ PS outu !(paid, d, p, v) ∈ rt),
(v ∈ H ∧ PS outv !(received, d, p, u) ∈ rt), and (ac ∈ H ∧ PS outac!(transfer, d, p, u, v) ∈ rt).
Definition 4.1 (Weak Atomicity) A trace r is contained in Reqweak atom if and only if for all d ∈ Σ∗,
p ∈ N, u ∈Mclient, v ∈ Mmerchant, and t2 ∈ N:
SuccessHonestTerm(d, p, u, v, ac, r, t2) ⇒
∃t1, t
′
1, t
′′
1 < t2 :(
(u ∈ H ⇒ PS inu?(pay, d, p, v) ∈ rt1)
∧(v ∈ H ⇒ PS inv?(receive, d, p, u) ∈ rt′
1
)
∧ (ac ∈ H ⇒ PS inac?(allow, d, p, u, v) ∈ rt′′
1
)
)
.
✸
The main complementary feature of the payment system is its full disputability, i.e., every participant is
able to prove that a completed payment has taken place. One can identify two main properties for disputes
to be meaningful. First, a party following the protocol wants to be sure that if she initiates a dispute after
successfully completing the protocol, the result of the trusted third party has to be true independent of
the behavior of other parties. Since the underlying reactive setting grants the adversary full control over
the network and in particular to suppress arbitrary messages, we cannot prove statements that “something
good” occurs in the future, e.g., that a dispute will be won. We instead formulate the property in a way
that allows for backward reasoning. We only formalize the dispute properties for clients; the analogue for
merchants and the acquirer can be obtained by simple textual replacement.
Definition 4.2 (Correct Disputing (Client Part)) A trace r is contained in Reqcorr disp client if and only
if for all d ∈ Σ∗, p ∈ N, u ∈ Hclient, v ∈ Mmerchant, and t3 ∈ N:
PS outttp!(dispute, paid, false, d, p, u, v) ∈ rt3
⇒
(
∃t2 < t3 : (PS inu?(dispute, d, p, v) ∈ rt2
∧∀t1 < t2 : PS outu !(paid, d, p, v) 6∈ rt1)
)
.
✸
Secondly, an honest party wants to be sure that she cannot be blamed for having participated in a payment
which she was not involved in, i.e., a dispute for this payment may only be successful if she previously
made the corresponding input.
Definition 4.3 (No Framing (Client Part)) A trace r is contained in Reqno frame client if and only if for
all d ∈ Σ∗, p ∈ N, u ∈ Hclient, v ∈ Mmerchant, t2 ∈ N, and x ∈ {received, transfer}:
PS outttp?(dispute, x, true, d, p, u, v) ∈ rt2 ⇒
∃t1 < t2 : PS inu?(pay, d, p, v) ∈ rt1 .
✸
Let Reqcorr disp denote the conjunction of Reqcorr disp client and the corresponding properties for merchants
and the acquirer; similarly, let Reqno frame denote the conjunction of Reqno frame client and its counterparts
for merchants and the acquirer.
The notion of a system Sys fulfilling an integrity property Req essentially comes in two flavors [10].
Perfect fulfillment, Sys |=perf Req , means that the integrity property holds for all traces arising in runs of
Sys (a well-defined notion from the underlying model [76]). Computational fulfillment, Sys |=poly Req ,
means that the property only holds for polynomially bounded users and adversaries, and that a negligi-
ble error probability is permitted. Perfect fulfillment implies computational fulfillment. The following
theorem summarizes what we prove for these requirements:
Theorem 4.1 (Security of the Payment System) Let ReqPS := Reqweak atom ∩ Reqcorr disp ∩
Reqno frame. For the payment system from Section 3.3 we have SysPS,id |=perf ReqPS and SysPS,real |=poly
ReqPS. ✷
Note that we did not consider properties concerning the confidentiality of the data involved in the pay-
ment. This is similar to the iKP payment system, which does not provide confidentiality itself but instead
assumes external mechanisms like underlying secure channels for this task. We can model these mech-
anisms in our underlying framework as well by inserting secure channel machines between the links of
the protocol machines and the cryptographic library, and the corresponding confidentiality properties can
then be easily shown.
5 Proof of the Cryptographic Realization from the Idealization
As discussed in the introduction, the idea of our approach is to prove Theorem 4.1 for the payment
protocol using the ideal Dolev-Yao-style library. Then the result for the real system follows automatically.
The notion that a system Sys1 securely implements another system Sys2 is called reactive simulata-
bility (recall the introduction), and is written Sys1 ≥polysec Sys2 (in the computational case). The main
result of [22] is therefore
Syscry,real ≥polysec Sys
cry,id. (1)
Since SysPS,real and SysPS,id are compositions of the same protocol with Syscry,real and Syscry,id, respec-
tively, the composition theorem of [76] and (1) imply
SysPS,real ≥polysec Sys
PS,id. (2)
Showing the theorem’s preconditions is easy since the machines MPSu are polynomial-time (see Sec-
tion 3.4). Finally, the integrity preservation theorem from [10] and (2) imply for every integrity property
Req that
(SysPS,id |=poly Req) ⇒ (SysPS,real |=poly Req). (3)
Hence if we prove SysPS,id |=perf ReqPS, we immediately obtain SysPS,real |=poly ReqPS from (3).
6 Proof in the Ideal Setting
This section sketches the proof of the ideal part of Theorem 4.1: We prove that the payment protocol
implemented with the ideal, Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library perfectly fulfills the property ReqPS.
The main challenge in this proof was to find suitable invariants on the state of the ideal payment system.
We start this section with a rigorous definition of the possible states of the ideal cryptographic library
as needed for formulating the invariants. We then define the invariants and show how to exploit them to
prove the overall integrity property of the payment system. The proof of the overall integrity property is
postponed to Appendix A; the proofs of the invariants are omitted due to lack of space.
6.1 Overview and States of the Ideal Cryptographic Library
The ideal cryptographic library administrates Dolev-Yao-style terms and allows each user to operate on
them via handles, i.e., via local names specific to this user. The handles also contain the information
that knowledge sets give in other Dolev-Yao formalizations: The set of terms that a participant u knows,
including u = a for the adversary, is the set of terms with a handle for u. As we saw in the payment
algorithms, the library offers its user (and the adversary) the typical operations on terms to which they
have handles, e.g., signing with a secret key and signature verification with a public key. The terms are
typed; for instance, signature verification only succeeds on signatures and projection only on lists. As
secure encryption schemes are necessarily probabilistic and so are most signature schemes, and as the
library allows the generation of polynomially many nonces and key pairs, multiple instances of terms
of almost every structure can occur, e.g., multiple signatures of the same message m with the same key
sks . There are multiple ways to deal with this in prior Dolev-Yao models, e.g., counting (for nonces)
and multisets. The version in [22] corresponds to counting: The terms are globally numbered by an
index. Each term is represented by its type (i.e., root node) and its first-level arguments, which can be
indices of earlier terms. This enables easy distinction of, e.g., which of many nonces is signed in a larger
term. These global indices are never visible at the user interface. The indices and the handles for each
participant are generated by one counter each.
A novel aspect of this cryptographic library compared with prior Dolev-Yao models is that terms have
an abstract length parameter, indicating the length of the corresponding real message. It is derived from a
tuple L of length functions that denote how the length of a term depends on the length of its subterms. This
is necessary because real encryption cannot entirely hide the length of cleartexts. Moreover, L contains
bounds on the accepted message lengths and the number of accepted inputs at each port. All these
bounds can be arbitrary, except that they be polynomially bounded in a security parameter k. Formally,
the number n of participants and the tuple L are parameters of the system Syscry,id, but we omitted them
for readability.
Similarly, n and a tuple L′ should be parameters of our ideal payment system SysPS,id, see Sec-
tion 3.4. As the machines MPSu of this system only make bounded-length inputs to the cryptographic
library given n and L′, the bounds in L can easily be chosen large enough so that all these inputs are
legal. Further, as we only prove an integrity properties, it is not a problem in the proof that the number of
accepted inputs might be exceeded. This is why we can omit the details of the length functions.
As described above, the terms in the ideal cryptographic library, i.e., in the trusted host THcryH for
every set H of honest participants, are represented by their top level, and knowledge of them by potential
handles for the different participants. The data structure chosen for this in [22] is a database D in which
each entry x in D can have the arguments
(ind , type , arg , hndu1 , . . . , hndum, hnd a, len),
where H = {u1, . . . , um} and the arguments have the following types and meaning:
• x.ind is the global index of an entry.
• x.type ∈ typeset identifies the type of x. The types nonce, list, data (for payload data), sks and
pks (for secret and public signature keys), and sig (for signatures) occur in the following.
• x.arg = (a1, a2, . . . , aj) is a possibly empty list of arguments. Arguments of type INDS are
indices of other entries (subterms); we sometimes distinguish them by a superscript “ind”.
• x.hndu ∈ HNDS ∪ {↓} for u ∈ H ∪ {a} are handles, where x.hndu = ↓ means that u does not
know this entry.
• x.len ∈ N0 denotes the length of the entry.
The machine THcryH has a counter size ∈ INDS for the current size of D and counters curhndu (current
handle) for the handles, all initialized with 0.
The assumption that keys have already been generated and distributed means that for each u ∈ M
two entries of the following form are added to D, where {u1, . . . , um} := H:
(sksu, type := sks, arg := (0), hndu := sks
hnd
u ,
len := 0);
(pksu, type := pks, arg := (),
hndu1 := pks
hnd
u1,u
, . . . , hndum := pks
hnd
um,u
,
hnda := pks
hnd
a,u , len := pks len
∗(k)).
Here sksu and pksu are consecutive natural numbers, pks len∗ is the length function for public keys, and
the argument of the secret key entry stores the number of messages that have already been signed with
this key. Treating secret keys as being of length 0 is a technicality in [22] and will not matter in the sequel.
6.2 Invariants
This section contains invariants of the system SysPS,id, which are used in the proof of the ideal part of
Theorem 4.1. The first invariant, no modification, states that attributes of database entries of honest users
are never changed after they have been initialized. This is true for all attributes except for status , which
may additionally change to processed. We let rt : DPSu denote the contents of database DPSu at time t in
trace r.
Invariant 1 (No Modification) For all u ∈ H, i ∈ INDS, t1 ∈ N, all traces r arising in runs of
SysPS,id, and s := t1 : DPSu [i].status:
(rt1 : D
PS
u [i].x 6= ↓ ∧ x 6= status ⇒
∀t2 > t1 : (rt2 : D
PS
u [i].x = rt1 : D
PS
u [i].x))
∧ (s ∈ {pay, invoice, allow, auth request} ⇒
∀t2 > t1 : (rt2 : D
PS
u [i].status ∈ {s, processed})).
The next invariant, unique payment entries, establishes that entries in the databases of honest parties are
uniquely determined by the price, the description, the client, and the merchant. We state this and the
following invariants exemplarily for honest clients.
Invariant 2 (Unique Payment Entries (Client Part)) For all u ∈ H, i1, i2 ∈ INDS, t ∈ N, and all
traces r arising in runs of SysPS,id:
rt : D
PS
u [i1].price = rt : D
PS
u [i2].price 6= ↓
∧ rt : D
PS
u [i1].desc = D
PS
u [i2].desc 6= ↓
∧ rt : D
PS
u [i1].merch = D
PS
u [i2].merch 6= ↓ ⇒
(i1 = i2).
The next invariant, correct signing, characterizes which lists will be signed by an honest party. It states
that all signed lists in the database D of the ideal cryptographic library that start with a payment element
are of the form (payment, d, p, u, v), and that a local command (pay, d, p, v) must have been received
before the entry was created. We use explanatory comments in the definition of the invariant to increase
readability.
rt2 : D[i].type = sig ∧ rt2 : D[i].arg [1] = pksu ∧ # If a payment message is
x1 = payment⇒ # signed with u’s key, then(
x4 = u ∧ # the message is of
∀j = 1, . . . , 5: (rt2 : D[yj].type = data) ∧ # the correct format and
∃t1 < t2 : (PS inu?(pay, x2, x3, x5) ∈ rt1)
)
. # a matching input has occurred.
Figure 3: Correct Signing Property (Client Part)
PS outu !(paid, d, p, v) ∈ rt ⇒ # If u terminates the protocol,(
rt : D[hndu = s
m].type = sig ∧ # the signatures of
rt : D[pk
m].hndu = pks
hnd
u,v ∧ # the merchant and
rt : D[hndu = s
ac].type = sig ∧ # the signature of
rt : D[pk
ac].hndu = pks
hnd
u,ac ∧ # the acquirer are stored,
xm1 = invoice ∧ x
m
2 = d ∧ x
m
3 = p ∧ x
m
5 = v ∧ # and they range
xac1 = auth response ∧ x
ac
2 = d ∧ x
ac
3 = p ∧ x
ac
5 = v
)
. # over the correct data.
Figure 4: Correct Storing Property (Client Part)
Invariant 3 (Correct Signing (Client Part)) For all u ∈ Mclient ∩H, i ∈ INDS, t2 ∈ N, and all traces
r arising in runs of SysPS,id, the formula in Figure 3 holds, where l := rt2 : D[i].arg [2] denotes the index
of the signed list, yj := rt2 : D[l].arg [j] the indices of the list elements, and xj := rt2 : D[yj ].arg [1] the
actual data for j = 1, . . . , 5.
In the proof of the overall integrity property, we will later show that certain outputs of honest users
may only occur after signatures of specific messages created with specific keys have been received, e.g.,
that the machine of an honest acquirer only outputs an allow message if it formerly received a signature
that is valid with respect to the respective client’s public key. Then correct signing will allow us to deduce
that the message is of the correct format and that a previous input by the client must have occurred.
The last invariant, correct storing, captures that an honest user has stored the signatures of both
remaining parties if it successfully terminates the protocol. We again show the invariant exemplarily for
honest clients; it states that if the machine of a client u outputs (paid, d, p, v) then it correctly stored the
signatures of both remaining parties, i.e., sigm is a signature of a list (invoice, d, p, u, v) signed by v and
sigac is a signature of a list (auth response, d, p, u, v) signed by ac.
Invariant 4 (Correct Storing (Client Part)) For all u ∈ Mclient ∩ H, d ∈ Σ∗, p ∈ N, v ∈ Mmerchant,
t ∈ N, and all traces r arising in runs of SysPS,id, the formula in Figure 4 holds, where for w ∈ {m, ac},
we let sw := rt : DPSu [desc = d ∧ price = p ∧ merch = v].sigw denote the handle to w’s signature,
pkw := rt : D[hndu = s
w].arg [1] the index of the public key used, lw := rt : D[hndu = sw].arg [2]
the index of the signed list, ywj := rt : D[lw].arg [j] the indices of the list elements, and xwj := rt :
D[ywj ].arg [1] the actual data for j = 1, . . . , 5.
This invariant is key for proving the disputability properties of the protocol since it implies that dispute
messages sent by honest users are always of a specific format and the contained signatures are valid with
respect to specific public keys. Based on this, we can easily infer the output of the trusted third party.
7 Conclusion and Outlook
We have proven an electronic payment system to be secure in the real cryptographic setting. The payment
system is a slightly simplified variant of the 3KP payment system and comprises a variety of different
security requirements ranging from the impossibility of unauthorized payments and weak atomicity to
more sophisticated properties like disputability. The proof was done by exploiting a Dolev-Yao-style de-
terministic idealization of cryptography which has a provably secure real cryptographic implementation
in the sense that security is reduced to the hardness of underlying computational assumptions. Compo-
sition and integrity preservation theorems from the underlying model imply that the protocol proof with
the idealized cryptography carries over to the real protocol implementation. This was the first example
of such a proof for protocols involving digital signatures, and for Dolev-Yao style payment systems in
general. In spite of certain differences to usual Dolev-Yao variants, in particular a representation of terms
or real cryptographic objects to the protocol layer by handles (local names) and length functions in the
idealization, the proof seems to be of a type readily accessible to automatic proof tools.
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A Postponed Proofs
Algorithm 4 Merchant: Evaluation of User Inputs for Receiving in MPSu
Input: (receive, d, p, v) at PS inu? with d ∈ Σ∗, p ∈ N, and v ∈ Mclient.
1: if DPSu [desc = d ∧ price = p ∧ client = v] = ↓ then
2: DPSu :⇐ (cur indu++, d, p, v, ↓, ↓).
3: invoicehnd ← store(invoice).
4: dhnd ← store(d).
5: phnd ← store(p).
6: uhnd ← store(u).
7: vhnd ← store(v).
8: lhnd ← list(invoicehnd, dhnd, phnd, vhnd, uhnd).
9: shnd ← sign(lhnd).
10: mhnd ← list(invoicehnd, shnd).
11: send i(v,mhnd).
12: end if
A.1 Proof of the Overall Integrity Property
Proposition A.1 For the payment system from Section 3.3 and the weak atomicity property Reqweak atom,
we have SysPS,id |=perf Reqweak atom.
Proof. We only give the proof for the client part of weak atomicity, i.e., we prove the statement
SuccessHonestTerm(d, p, u, v, ac, r, t2) ∧ u ∈ H ⇒ ∃t1 < t2 : PS inu?(pay, d, p, v) ∈ rt1 . The
other parts can be proved similarly. Let d ∈ Σ∗, p ∈ N, u ∈ Mclient ∩ H, v ∈ Mmerchant,
t2 ∈ N, r a trace arising in runs of SysPS,id, and i := rt2 : DPSu [desc = d ∧ price = p ∧
merch = v].ind. Recall that SuccessHonestTerm(d, p, u, v, ac, r, t2) is defined as the disjunction
of (u ∈ H ∧ PS outu !(paid, d, p, v) ∈ rt2), (v ∈ H ∧ PS outv !(received, d, p, u) ∈ rt2), and
(ac ∈ H ∧ PS outac!(transfer, d, p, u, v) ∈ rt2). We will prove these three cases separately.
Assume PS outu !(paid, d, p, v) ∈ rt2 . This output may only occur in Step 2.28. Step 2.25 and 2.26
together with unique payment entries and no modification implies rt2 : DPSu [i].status = processed, and
the status of DPSu [i] may only have been set to processed in Step 1.3 or 2.11. In the first case, Step 1.1
immediately implies that there the algorithm was activated on input (pay, d, p, v) at port PS inu? at some
time t1 < t2. In the second case, Step 2.9 ensures rt′
1
: DPSu [i].status = pay for some t′1 < t2, hence this
entry was created in Step 1.14. Again the algorithm was activated on inputs (pay, d, p, v) at port PS inu?
at some time t1 < t′1 < t2.
Assume PS outv !(received, d, p, u) ∈ rt2 and v ∈ H. This output may only occur in Step 6.28. Let
j := rt2 : D
PS
v [desc = d∧price = p∧client = u].ind . Step 6.23 and 6.24 together with unique payment
entries and no modification imply rt2 : DPSv [j].sigc 6= ↓. The only step where v assigns a value different
from ↓ to attribute sigc is in Step 6.10. Let lhnd2 = rt2 : DPSv [j].sigc and let i := rt2 : D[hndv = lhnd2 ].ind .
Let l := rt2 : D[i].arg [2], yj := rt2 : D[l].arg [j], and xj := rt2 : D[yj].arg [1] for j = 1, . . . , 5. Then
Steps 6.4-6.9, the definition of the commands verify, list proj, and retrieve imply rt2 : D[i].type = sig,
rt2 : D[i].arg [1] = pksu, x1 = payment, x2 = d, x3 = p, and x5 = v. Hence the entry D[i] fulfills the
requirements of the correct signing, thus there exists t1 < t2 such that PS inu?(pay, d, p, v) ∈ rt1 .
Assume PS outac!(transfer, d, p, u, v) ∈ trt2 and ac ∈ H. This output may only occur in Step 8.23.
This case can be proven exactly as the previous one with the corresponding Steps of Algorithm 8.
Proposition A.2 For the payment system from Section 3.3 and the correct disputing property Reqcorr disp,
we have SysPS,id |=perf Reqcorr disp.
Algorithm 5 Acquirer: Evaluation of User Inputs for Allow in MPSac
Input: (allow, d, p, u, v) at PS inac? with d ∈ CHARSET , p ∈ N, u ∈ Mclient, and v ∈ Mmerchant.
1: i := DPSac [desc = d ∧ price = p ∧ client = u ∧merch = v].ind.
2: if i 6= ↓ ∧ DPSac [i].status = auth request then
3: DPSac [i].status := processed.
4: auth responsehnd ← store(auth response).
5: dhnd ← store(d).
6: phnd ← store(p).
7: uhnd ← store(u).
8: vhnd ← store(v).
9: lhnd ← list(auth responsehnd, dhnd, phnd, uhnd, vhnd).
10: shnd ← sign(skshndac , l
hnd).
11: mhnd ← list(auth responsehnd, shnd).
12: send i(v,mhnd).
13: else if i = ↓ then
14: DPSac :⇐ (cur indac++, d, p, u, v, ↓, ↓, allow).
15: end if
Proof. Let d ∈ Σ∗, p ∈ N, u ∈ Mclient ∩ H, v ∈ Mmerchant, t3 ∈ N, and r a trace arising in runs
of SysPS,id. Again, we only show the client part of the statement, i.e., assume PS outttp!(dispute, paid,
false, d, p, u, v) ∈ rt3 . The output must have occured in Step 10.20.
The algorithm is invoked only on input (w, ttp, i, lhnd). Let i := D[hndttp = lhnd].arg [1], l1 :=
D[i].arg [2], (pk, s1, s2) := D[l1].arg [1, 2, 3], yj := D[s1].arg [j], and xj := D[yj].arg [1] for j =
1, . . . , 5. Step 10.17 implies w = x4 = u.
Now Step 10.1-8 and the definition of the commands verify, list proj, and msg of sig imply
D[i].type = sig and pk = pksu. It can then be shown along the lines of the proof of correct signing that
MPSu must have input a command sign(dispute,D[s1].hndu,D[s2].hndu) such that x1 = payment, x2 =
d, x3 = p, x4 = u, and x5 = v. The only syntactically matching sign command is in Step 3.4, and
is executed only on input (dispute, d, p, v) at PS inu? at some time t2 < t3. We remain to show the
nonexistence of an output (paid, d, p, v) at PS outu ! for all times t1 < t2. We prove this by contradic-
tion. Assume that there exists t1 ∈ N such that PS outu !(paid, d, p, v) ∈ rt1 . Then by correct storing
both signatures sigm and sigac have been stored and the condition in Step 10.17 can easily shown to be
true, i.e., the output of Step 10.20 will never occur. (This last step can be made more formal but requires
re-stating the whole formalism of the invariant and seems to complicate understanding here.)
Proposition A.3 For the payment system from Section 3.3 and the no framing property Reqno frame, we
have SysPS,id |=perf Reqno frame.
Proof. Let x ∈ {received, transfer}, d ∈ Σ∗, p ∈ N, u ∈ Hclient, v ∈ Mmerchant, t2 ∈ N, and r be a
trace arising in runs of SysPS,id. Again we prove only the client part of the statement, i.e., we prove the
statement PS outttp!(dispute, d, p, u, v) ∈ rt2 ⇒ ∃t1 < t2 : PS inu?(pay, d, p, v) ∈ rt1 .
Assume PS outttp?(dispute, x, true, d, p, u, v) ∈ rt2 for x = received (x = transfer). This output
occurs only in Step 10.26 (in Step 10.34). With lhnd
2
as in Algorithm 10, let i := rt2 : D[hndttp =
lhnd
2
].ind . Now Step 10.23 and 10.25 (Step 10.31 and 10.33) ensure that D[i].type = sig, D[i].arg [1] =
pksx4 = D[i].arg [1] = pksu, and x1 = payment. This implies that D[i] meets the prerequisites correct
signing, hence there exists t1 < t2 such that PS inu?(pay, d, p, v) ∈ rt1 .
Algorithm 6 Merchant: Evaluation of Inputs from the Cryptographic Library in MPSu
Input: (v, u, i, lhnd) at outu? with v ∈Mclient ∪ {ac}.
1: lhndj ← list proj(l
hnd, j) for j = 1, 2.
2: l1 ← retrieve(lhnd1 ).
3: if l1 = payment ∧ v 6= ac then
4: mhnd
2
← msg of sig(lhnd
2
).
5: b← verify(lhnd
2
, pkshndu,v ,m
hnd
2
)
6: xhndj ← list proj(m
hnd
2
, j) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
7: xj ← retrieve(xhndj ) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
8: i := DPSu [desc = x2 ∧ price = x3 ∧ client = x4 ∧ sigc = ↓].ind.
9: if x1 = payment ∧ x4 = v ∧ x5 = u ∧ b = true ∧ i 6= ↓ then
10: DPSu [i].sigc := l
hnd
2
.
11: invoicehnd ← store(invoice).
12: mhnd
1
← list(invoicehnd, xhnd
2
, xhnd
3
, xhnd
4
, xhnd
5
).
13: shnd
1
← sign(skshndu ,m
hnd
1
).
14: auth requesthnd ← store(auth request).
15: mhnd ← list(auth requesthnd, lhnd
2
, shnd
1
).
16: send i(ac,mhnd)
17: end if
18: else if x1 = auth response ∧ v = ac then
19: mhnd
2
← msg of sig(lhnd
2
).
20: b← verify(lhnd
2
, pkshndu,v ,m
hnd
2
)
21: xhndj ← list proj(m
hnd
2
, j) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
22: xj ← retrieve(xhndj ) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
23: i := DPSu [desc = x2 ∧ price = x3 ∧ client = x4 ∧ sigc 6= ↓].ind.
24: if x5 = u ∧ b = true ∧ i 6= ↓ then
25: DPSu [i].sigac := l
hnd
2
.
26: confirmhnd ← store(confirm).
27: mhnd ← list(confirmhnd, lhnd
2
).
28: Output (received, x2, x3, x4) at PS outu !.
29: send i(x4,mhnd).
30: end if
31: end if
Algorithm 7 Merchant: Evaluation of User Inputs for Disputes in MPSu
Input: (dispute, d, p, v) at PS inu? with d ∈ Σ∗, p ∈ N, and v ∈ Mclient.
1: if i := DPSu [desc = d ∧ price = p ∧ client = v ∧ sigc 6= ↓ ∧ sigac 6= ↓].ind 6= ↓ then
2: disputehnd ← store(dispute).
3: lhnd ← list(disputehnd,DPSu [i].sigc,D
PS
u [i].sigac).
4: shnd ← sign(skshndu , l
hnd).
5: mhnd ← list(shnd).
6: send i(ttp,mhnd).
7: end if
Algorithm 8 Acquirer: Evaluation of Inputs from the Cryptographic Library in MPSac
Input: (v, ac, i, lhnd) at outac? with v ∈ Mmerchant.
1: lhndj ← list proj(l
hnd, j) for j = 1, 2, 3.
2: l1 ← retrieve(lhnd1 ).
3: if l1 6= auth request then
4: Abort
5: end if
6: mhndj ← msg of sig(l
hnd
j ) for j = 2, 3.
7: xhndj ← list proj(m
hnd
2
, j) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
8: xj ← retrieve(xhndj ) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
9: yhndj ← list proj(m
hnd
3
, j) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
10: yj ← retrieve(yhndj ) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
11: b2 ← verify(lhnd2 , pks
hnd
ac,x4
,mhnd
2
).
12: b3 ← verify(lhnd3 , pks
hnd
ac,v,m
hnd
3
).
13: if x1 = payment ∧ y1 = invoice ∧ b2 = b3 = true ∧ x5 = v ∧ ∀j = 2, . . . , 5: xj = yj then
14: i := DPSac [desc = x2 ∧ price = x3 ∧ client = x4 ∧merch = x5].
15: if i 6= ↓ ∧ DPSac [i].status = allow then
16: DPSac [i].sigc := l
hnd
2
.
17: DPSac [i].sigm := l
hnd
3
.
18: DPSac [i].status := processed.
19: auth responsehnd ← store(auth response).
20: mhnd
1
← list(auth responsehnd, xhnd
2
, xhnd
3
, xhnd
4
, xhnd
5
).
21: shnd ← sign(skshndac ,m
hnd
1
).
22: mhnd ← list(auth responsehnd, shnd).
23: Output (transfer, x2, x3, x4, x5) at PS outac!.
24: send i(v,mhnd).
25: else if i = ↓ then
26: DPSac :⇐ (cur indac++, x2, x3, x4, x5, l
hnd
1
, lhnd
2
, auth request).
27: end if
28: end if
Algorithm 9 Acquirer: Evaluation of User Inputs for Disputes in MPSac
Input: (dispute, d, p, u, v) at PS inac? with d ∈ Σ∗, p ∈ N, u ∈Mclient, and v ∈ Mmerch.
1: if i := DPSac [desc = d∧ price = p∧ client = u∧merch = v∧ sigc 6= ↓ ∧ sigm 6= ↓].ind 6= ↓ then
2: disputehnd ← store(dispute).
3: lhnd ← list(disputehnd,DPSac [i].sigc,D
PS
ac [i].sigm).
4: shnd ← sign(skshndac , l
hnd).
5: mhnd ← list(shnd).
6: send i(ttp,mhnd).
7: end if
Algorithm 10 TTP: Evaluation of Inputs from the Cryptographic Library in MPSttp
Input: (v, ttp, i, lhnd) at outttp? for v ∈ M \ {ttp}.
1: shnd ← list proj(lhnd, 1).
2: l∗
hnd
← msg of sig(shnd)
3: b1 ← verify(shnd, pkshndttp,v, l
∗hnd).
4: lhndj ← list proj(l
∗hnd , j) for j = 1, 2, 3.
5: l1 ← retrieve(lhnd1 ).
6: if l1 6= dispute ∨ b1 6= true then
7: Abort
8: end if
9: mhndj ← msg of sig(l
hnd
j ) for j = 2, 3.
10: xhndj ← list proj(m
hnd
2
, j) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
11: xj ← retrieve(xhndj ) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
12: yhndj ← list proj(m
hnd
3
, j) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
13: yj ← retrieve(yhndj ) for j = 1, . . . , 5.
14: if v ∈ Mclient then
15: b2 ← verify(lhnd2 , pks
hnd
ttp,x5
,mhnd
2
).
16: b3 ← verify(lhnd3 , pks
hnd
ttp,ac,m
hnd
3
).
17: if x1 = invoice∧ y1 = auth response∧ x4 = v ∧ b2 = b3 = true∧ ∀j = 2, . . . , 5: xj = yj then
18: Output (dispute, paid, true, x2, x3, x4, x5) at PS outttp!.
19: else
20: Output (dispute, paid, false, x2, x3, x4, x5) at PS outttp!.
21: end if
22: else if v ∈ Mmerchant then
23: b2 ← verify(lhnd2 , pks
hnd
ttp,x4
,mhnd
2
).
24: b3 ← verify(lhnd3 , pks
hnd
ttp,ac,m
hnd
3
).
25: if x1 = payment ∧ y1 = auth response ∧ x5 = v ∧ b2 = b3 = true ∧ ∀j = 2, . . . , 5: xj = yj
then
26: Output (dispute, received, true, x2, x3, x4, x5) at PS outttp!.
27: else
28: Output (dispute, received, false, x2, x3, x4, x5) at PS outttp!.
29: end if
30: else if v = ac then
31: b2 ← verify(lhnd2 , pks
hnd
ttp,x4
,mhnd
2
).
32: b3 ← verify(lhnd3 , pks
hnd
ttp,x5
,mhnd
3
).
33: if x1 = payment ∧ y1 = invoice ∧ b2 = b3 = true ∧ ∀j = 2, . . . , 5: xj = yj then
34: Output (dispute, transfer, true, x2, x3, x4, x5) at PS outttp!.
35: else
36: Output (dispute, transfer, false, x2, x3, x4, x5) at PS outttp!.
37: end if
38: end if
